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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SOUTH EAST FURNITURE and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plain tiffs-Appellants,

I
Case Nu.

vs.

11816

INDUSTRIAL
OF
UTAH and DEAN L. BARRETT,
Def endants-Res pu nde n ts.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF CASE
This matter arises out of a claim by the defendant,
Dean L. Barrett, requesting additional compensation
benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Utah.
1

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COlVIlVIISSION
The Industrial Commission ruled that the Appli.
cant was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits
notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had settled
his case for $6,250.00 with his automobile insurance
carrier.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff, State Insurance Fund, seeks a reversal of the Industrial Commission's ruling that defendant, Dean L. Barrett, is entitled to both workmen's
compensation benefits and the proceeds received from
an "uninsured motorist coverage" provision of his automobile liability insurance.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Dean L. Barrett, filed on January
24, 1968 an application for benefits under the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act (R. 8). He alleged in
said application and at the time of the hearing on this
matter that on November 10, 1966 while being employed by the plaintiff South East Furniture Company, he
was involved in an automobile accident during the
course of his employment. The plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, was the carrier for Mr. Barrett's employer and in connt:ction with his accident had paid
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J1cal expenses and temporary disability benefits \ R.
Jo). The plaintiff, The State Insurance .Fund, denied
fmthcr liability for the reason that the defendant, Dean
L. Barrett, had collected proceeds from his automobile
Automobile Insurliability carrier, State Farm
ance Company, in the amount of $6,250.00 ( R. 96).
1111

Pursuant to said denial a hearing was held before
the Industrial Commission on April 10, 1968. At the
hearing the defendant,
Barrett, testified that he
sustained a whiplash type of injury when his automobile was struck by an automobile driven by one Albert
Kindred. It appears from the record that .Mr. Kindred
was at fault and that Mr. Barrett claimed proceeds
under his liability policy with State Farm l\Iutual
Automobile Insurance Company. This policy was made
part of this record ( R. 89). The policy had an "uninsured automobile coverage" provision. Said provision
provides in part as follows:

"COVERAGE CT-Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by Uninsured Automobiles. To pay
all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury sustained by
the insured, caused by accident and arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of such
uninsured automobile; ... "
At the time of the accident in question Mr. Barrett was driving his own vehicle. The liability insurance on his vehicle was purchased and the premium was
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paid by :Mr. Barrett ..Mr. Barrett's employer, the South
East Furniture Company, required him to have liability
coverage for his automobile (R. 41). :Mr. Barrett was
paid on a piece-work basis and was reimbursed by his
employer for the use of his automobile on a mileage basis
(R. 45).

Subsequent to the time that Mr. B:1.rrett claimed
and received benefits from the State Insurance Fund
he, with his attorney, negotiated with the State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and entered
into a document entitled "Release and Trust Agreement'' (R. 96). Said agreement is attached hereto and
1s marked Exhibit A of Appendix 1.
Mr. Barrett received compensation benefits pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended. 1 This statute provides that if compensation is
1 35-1-62. "Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of thir1l
parties--Remedies of employee-Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of action-Maintenance of action-Disbursement of proceeds of recovery- When any injury or death
for which compensation is payable under this title shall have been
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another person not in
the same employment, the injured employee, or in case of
death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured
employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have
an action for damages against such third person. If compensation
is claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier
shall become trustee of the cause of action against the third
party and may bring and maintain the action either in its own
name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or
the personal representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not settle and release the cause of action
without the consent of the commission.
"If any recovery is obtained against such third person it
shall be disbursed as follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attor-
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paid based upon an accident which was caused bv the
wrongful act or neglect of another person, that
employee may claim compensation and may also claim
damages against '"such third persons". The statute also
provides that if compensation is claimed and paid, as
in this case, the insurance carrier becomes the trustee
of the cause of action against such "third party" and
may act either in its own name or in the name of the
employee. The statute further provides that any balance over and beyond the amount of compensation
which had been paid should be "applied to reduce or
satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing against
the person liable for compensation" ( 35-1-62 ( 3) ) after
the carrier or employer is compensated in full.
Mr. Barrett received a recovery and executed the
document entitled "Release and Trust Agreement"
without advising the plaintiffs and after receiving these
proceeds makes claim for additional compensation.
The State Insurance Fund urged upon the Industrial Commission that it was entitled to reimbursement
for sums expended and that it would have no additional
liability for compensation until the claim of the applicant would exceed the sum of $6,250.00 pursuant to the
provisions of 35-1-62, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The
neys' fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately against the
parties as their interests may appear.
(2) The person liable for nmpensation payments shall be
reimbursed in full for all payments made.
(3) The balance shall be paid
the injured
?r
his heirs in case of death, to be apphed to reduce or
m
full any obligation thereaftn accruing against the person hablr,
for compensation."
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Industrial Commission held that l\!Ir. Barrett was entitled to both Workmen's Compensation benefits and
the proceeds received by him pursuant to his uninsured
motorist coverage of his automobile liability policy.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMlVIISSION ERRED IN ALLOWING THE EMPLOYEE
DOUBLE RECOVERY.
The initial issue that needs to be determined is
whether or not the proceeds received pursuant to an uninsured motorist clause is to be considered recovery
against a "third person" within the meaning of 35-1-62,
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. An "uninsured motorist"
provision is a relatively new type of coverage that is
included within liability policies to protect drivers from
being injured by irresponsible persons unable to answer
in damages for their negligent acts on the highway.
Section 41-12-21.l sets forth the mandatory requirement (effective July l, 1967) that all automobile
liability policies must contain uninsured coverages. The
argument cannot be made, therefore, that one who has
uninsured coverage has voluntarily, at his own instance,
obtained a different type of coverage than other drivhighways. The compulsory reers on
quirement'. all policies;'fncludel an uninsured motor-
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ist clause is to protect innocent parties from the financial inability of an ''uninsured motorist". This general
principle is articulated at 70 ALR 2d page 1252 in
an annotation entitled "Rights and Liabilities
'Uninsured l\ilotorist' Coverage". This annotation in
its introduction states as follows:
§1. Scope and related matters.

"This anuotation deals with cases which have
discussed 'uninsured motorists coverage,' a new
type of automobile insurance which came into
being as the result of public concern over the
increasingly important problems arising from
injuries inflicted by negligent motorists who are
uninsured and financially irresponsible.
"Designed to further close the gaps inherent
in motor vehicle financial responsibility and compulsory insurance legislation, this insurance coverage is intended, within fixed limits, to provide
financial recompense to innocent persons who
receive injuries, and the dependents of those who
are killed, through the wrongful conduct of
motorists who, because they are uninsured and
not financially responsible, cannot be made to
respond in damages."
The question to be determined, therefore, is whether or not recovery, pursuant to an uninsured motorist
claim is to be considered recovery against the third
party tort-feasor or whether or not recovery should be
considered as recovery pursuant to a personal contract
of insurance. Or, stated differently, is recovery under
an uninsured motorist claim to be considered recovery
against "third persons" within the meaning of 35-1-62.
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In a recent Oregon case, Peterson v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 238 Ore. 106,
393 P. 2d 651, the Oregon court initially discussed the
reason and the effect of uninsured motorist clauses. The
court stated as follows:
" [ 1] The basic purpose of the uninsured motorist provision seems clear. It provides protection for the automobile insurance policyholder
against the risk of inadequate compensation for
injuries or death caused by the negligence of
financially irresponsible motorists. See Note, 2
\Vill. L.J. 56, 61 (1962); Commissioners of the
State Insurance Fund v. 1\-Iiller, 4 A. D. 2d 481,
166 N.Y.S. 2d 777, 779 (1st Dept. 1957). In
other words, the legislative purpose in creating
compulsory uninsured motorist coverage was to
place the injured policyholder in the same position he would have been in if the tortfeasor had
had liability insurance."
The question presented in this case was whether
or not the Insurance Commissioner of Oregon had authority to approve proYisions in the uninsured motorist
section of a policy reducing the liability of the carrier
by the amount paid to a person in the form of \Vorkmen 's Compensation Benefits.
The court stated in part as follows:
"In all of the decisions mentioned, the defendant, seeking to take advantage of the plaintiff's receipt of benefits from some other source,
has been a tort-feasor; but here, the defendant
is a contracting party, not a tort-feasor. This
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difj'erencc, lwu:cver, is not material in the sense
that the basic legislative purpose in requiri11q
uninsured nwtorist insurance is to place the
jured parflJ in the same position
u;ould have
been
if the t.urt-fcasur had hod lia/Jility insurance. (Emphasis added).
The Oregon Court, therefore, has properly construed an uninsured motorist clause to have the same
effect as recovery from the defendant tort-feasor. \Yhen
a claim is presented to an insurance company under an
uninsured motorist clause, the insurance carrier negotiates with the insured in the same manner as it would if
it was representing the third party tort-feasor. This
anomaly is brought about by the provisions of the policy
which provided the
is liable "to pay all sums
which the insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages". The Oregon Court's decision,
therefore, is realistic and has properly characterized the
effect of an uninsured motorist policy. To argue differently would be engaging in a legal fiction which is not
supported by logic or practical analysis.
Subsequent to the accident, the State Farm .Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, for all practical purposes, was negotiating with, and effectuated a settlement as if it represented the third party tort-feasor, one
Alfred Kindred. It is respectfully urged that recovery
in the form of settlement or otherwise, based upon an
uninsured motorist clause should be considered a recoYery against "a third person" within the meaning of 3.51-62, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
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There is authority that both compensation and
workmen's compensation benefits may be received. See
Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Miller, 4
App. Div. 2d 481, 166 N.Y. Supp. 2d 777; Horne v.
Superior Life Insurance Company, 203 Va. 282, 123

S .E. 2d 40 l ( 1962) •

It is submitted, however, that a better reasoned
decision in Jones v. 1lf orri.wn, U.S. D. Ct., Ark. 284 F.
Supp. 1016 ( 1968). In this case the court examined the
Arkansas statute in regard to third party liability. This
statute is similar in import to 35-1-62. The Arkansas
statute, 81-1340, provides as foIIows:

"Third party liability.-( a) Liability unaffected.
( l ) The making of a claim for compensation against any employer or carrier for the
injury or death of an employee shaU not affect
the right of the employee, or his dependents, to
make claim or maintain an action in court
against any third party for such injury, but the
employer or his carrier shaU be entitled to reasonable notice and opportunity to join in such
action. If they, or either of them, join in such
action they shaII be entitled to a first lien upon
two-thirds [2-3} of the net proceeds recovered
in such action that remain after the payment
of the reasonable costs of coUection, for the payment to them of the amount paid and to be paid
by them as compensation to the injured employee or his dependents.

The commencement of an action by an
employee or his dependents against a third party
" ( 2)
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by reason of an inJury, tu wluch
this
81-1301-81-1349} is applicable, or
the adJustment of any such claim shall not affect the rights of the injured employee or his
dependents to recover compensation, but any
ai:nount
by the injured employee or
dependents irom a third party shall be applied as follows: Reasonable costs of collection
shall be deducted; then one-third [1-3} of the
shall, in every case, belong to the
lilJUred employee or his dependents, as the case
may be; the remainder, or so much thereof as is
necessary to discharge the actual amount of the
liability of the employer and the carrier; and
any excess shall belong to the injured employee
or his dependents."
The general mtent of the ...:\rkansas statute is, of
course, the same as our statute in regard to third party
actions. It should be noted, however, that the statute
is somewhat more stringent in that the employee must
give notice to his employer or insurance carrier in order
to afford them an opportunity to join in the action.
The issue presented to the court was whether or not
settlement against an insurance carrier would be considered settlement against "a third person". The court
specifically faced this issue and held that recoyery
against the insurance carrier would be considered a recovery both againsl auy .. third party." The court recognized the holding i11 llurnc i'. Su11criur Life ln:mrancc
Company, supra, :i11d
uf Stoic ln.rnrmve F1111rl 1·. "'Jfiller .,11pr11. :1ml
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"In Horne it was held that recovery by the
injured party against the uninsured motorist
carrier was not a recovery against 'any other
party.' In other words, this recovery is not
equivalent to a recovery against a third party
tortfeasor. This part of the opinion is in conflict with the applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Any recovery by the
injured party, regardless of whom from, is in
the nature of compensation for the injuries.
The 'workmen's compensation' is designed to
protect employees against work-connected accidents resulting from any cause, including employers' negligence, the employee's own negligence, and acts of God. Also protected agaiQSt
is negligence of third parties. However, in this
event the compensation carrier is given the right
to recover its expenses from the third party.
When the injury is the result of acts of the
employer, the employee or God, there is no one
to whom the compensation carrier may look for
reimbursement. This is the risk which forms the
basis for the compensation insurance premiums.
This is not the case when the negligence of
third parties enters the picture. Were it otherwise, the injured employee would be entitled to
collect his workmen's compensation benefits and
then seek recovery against a third-party tortf easor, with the possibility of something in the
nature of a 'double recovery.' To provide such
is not the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act. When an injured party recovers
on account of his injuries, regardless of from
which third party, he has been compensated
and, having already paid, the compensation carrier is entitled to reimbursement to the extent
provided in the Act. Ark.State.Ann. § 81-1340
(supra).''
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It is submitted, therefore, that the nub of the matter is whether or not when a person is injured within the
scope of his employment, he is entitled to double recovery. It is submitted that compensation benefits is
a unique type of insurance, whose purpose is to afford
quick and speedy help to the workmen when injured. It
is submitted that double recovery in these circumstances
is not appropriate. In examining the philosophy of the
uninsured motorist clause and particularly the fact that
said clause is now a mandatory provision in all litbility policies, the employee should not be allowed to collect twice.

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMlHISSION ERRED IN ALLOWING WORKMEN'S COl\1PENSATION BENEFITS IN LIGHT OF THE
RELEASE AND TRUST AGREEMENT.
As mentioned earlier herein, the defendant, Dean
L. Barrett, and his attorney, after workmen's compensation benefits had been paid, negotiated with the insurance carrier and received recovery in the amount of
$6,250.00. Mr. Barrett entered into a form contract
which was entitled "Release and Trust Agreement,"
which is attached hereto marked Exhibit A of Appendix
1. Said agreement assigned to the liability insurance carrier any rights he,
Barrett, may ha,·e against the
13

third party tort-feasor, one Albert h.mdred. It is the
position of the plaintiffs herein that this act, for all practical purposes, negates the plai11tiff, the State Insurance
.Fund, the right it has to pursue its action pursuant to
35-l-62, C.C.A. Hl53, as amended.
35-1-62 has gone through many legislative changes.

Initially, the employee had the right to elect to proceed
against a third party, or receive compensation. Subsequent thereto if an injured employee was desirous of
claiming compensation, he was required to assign his
claim against the "third party" to the carrier. In 1945
the legislature amended 35-1-62 to its present form.
The statute, it is submitted, carefully provides that
there is but one claim that can be brought against a
third person. The employer may commence the action
and claim compensation, but if recovery is had, "the
person liable for compensation benefits shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made" and the balance
should be paid to reduce or satisfy any additional compensation obligation. The statute also provides that if
compensation is paid, the employer becomes a trustee
nf the cause of action and may bring an action against a
third person, either in its own name or in the name of
the injured employee. The statute allows, therefore, the
ultimate wrongdoer to be answerable for the damage
that he causes.
It appears clear that the legislature never intended that there be two causes of action against the wrongdoer. It is clear also that if the employee commences the
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action and prosecutes the same successfully, that the
carrier must be compensated in full. If the carrier
commences the action, he does so in a trust relationship
and is reimbursed in full. It is submitted, therefore,
that the giving by l\Ir. Barrett an assignment of his
right to proceed against the third party tort-feasor to his
liability carrier, that he has effectively negated the
plaintiffs right to full reimbursement.
Certainly, the Release and Trust Agreement received by State Farm :Mutual Automobile Insurance
Barrett
Company vests with them the claim that
may have against Albert Kindred, the tort-feasor. Now
the plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, would not be
allowed to sue the third party tort-feasor in its capacity
as Trustee, pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-62, since
the carrier knows the injured employee has assigned all
right, title and interest to another entity. If action is
commenced by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, said company has no duty to see that the
plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, be reimbursed in
full, and if recovery is had against the third party tortfeasor, by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, is the plaintiff still required to pay compensation?
The effect of this agreement entitled "Trust and
Release Agreement" is simply that the defendant, )Ir.
Barrett, is attempting to split a cause of action. It is
submitted that 35-1-62 clearly does not allow for the
splitting of a cause of action. It is clear also that split-
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ting of causes of action in Utah are not favored. The
obvious reason being the multiplicity of claims and the
protection of the potential defendant from successful
law actions.
In an early case, Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 293,
254 Pac. 784-, the court, in quoting from authorities,
stated that a party having one claim cannot split the
demand into separate causes of action. The court said:
"'There are no maxims of the law more firmly
established or of more value in the administration
of justice than the two which are designed to
prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy".
This early announcement of not allowing a splitting of causes of action has been sustained in more recent cases. See Johnson v. Cudahy Packing Company,
107 Utah 114, 152 P. 2d 98 ( 1944) and Cederloff v.
rVhited, 110 Gtah 45, 169 P. 2d 777 ( 1946).
It is submitted that the language in a recent Utah
case is helpful in solving the problems presented here.
111 Raymer v. Hi-Line Transport, Inc., 15 Utah 2d
427. 394 P. 2d 383, the court clearly stated that one may
not
its causes of action even where insurance was
involved. the Court stated:
""Te are confronted with the long-established
rule against 'splitting cause of action.' If neither
nor Hi-Line had insurance coverage,
Rnrmcr would have been foreclosed from insti16

tuting two actions-one for his property damage
and one for his personal injuries. Does the fact
that
was insurance coYerage gi,·e rise to
an exception to the
In the instant case we
think not.
'
"An annotation in 62 A.L.R.2d reports, commencing at page 982:
'In a substantial majority of jurisdictions, a
single act causing simultaneous injury to the
physical person and property of one indiYidual is
held to give rise to only one cause of action, and
not to separate causes based, on the one hand,
on the personal injury, and on the other the property loss. * * *
'In jurisdictions supporting the single cause
of action rule, the courts have most often taken
the view that the rule accurately reflects the principle that a cause of action inheres in the causative aspect of a breach of a legal duty-that is,
the wrongful act itself-and not in the various
forms of harm which flow therefrom. Recognition of the existence of only one cause of action
is said to benefit both plaintiffs (freeing them
of delay and burdensome expense) and defendants (relieving them of the injustice of being
subjected to more than one suit for a single
tort), and to be in harmony with public policy
and the tendency toward simplicity and directness in the determination of contro,·ersial rights
and the elimination of a multiplicity of suits.

* * *

'The argument that the single cauu of action rule may tt·ork injustice in ca.ms where
one of' the elcment.s of' damages is the suh;ect
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of insurance has also been rejected.' ( emphasis added)

"It seems logical that if an assured cannot
split his cause of action, the insurer should not
be in a better position."
In the cases which have allowed double recO\·ery it was recognized that the insurance carrier's
right of subrogation was not negated. In those cases
subrogation rights were created and protected by a
lien-type of statute. In both Commissioners of the State
Insurance Fund v. 1l.liller, supra, and Horne v. Superior Life Insurance Company, supra, it was clearly indicated because of the statutory language of those particular states that the insurance carrier's subrogation
rights were not abrogated (but see the recent New J ersey case of Feliciano t:. Oglesby, 102 N.J. Supp., 378,
246 A. 2d 63, where the court held it would not allow an
assignment of a cause of action pursuant to an uninsured motorist prm·ision to violate a New Jersey trust
fund). It is submitted, however, that that is not the
case in this instance, that the defendant-applicant has
effectively negated the carrier's right to proceed against
the ultimate wrongdoer while he, the applicant, receives
double recoYery. If suit is brought against Kindred by
either the plaintiff, the State Insurance Fund, or the
Automobile Insurliability carrier, State Farm
ance Company, there has been a splitting of a cause of
action. There has been an aborting of the spirit and
intent of 35-1-62 that allows the workman a speedy recoYery and a right against the ultimate wrongdoer.
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If this procedure, which is urged by the def end-

ants in this case, was allowed, there would be a race to
the courthouse since it would become clear that two entities could not, and should not be able to proceed
against a tort-f easor arising out of a single claim.

It is the belief of the plaintiff, therefore, that once
a settlement has been completed between the employee
and a third party that no additional liability can be assigned to the workmen's compensation carrier. It is
submitted that the note writer in the Utah Law Review,
Volume No. 9, Number 4, Winter, 1965 at page 945
clearly states what the law should be in these cases:
"Under the general rule that an employer is
entitled to be subrogated to his employee's claim
against a third party to the extent of his compensation liability, questions arise concerning
the effect that a settlement between the third
person and the employee should have upon the
employer's subrogation rights. The employer's
subrogation rights are protected in certain jurisdictions where it has been held that settlement
between an injured employee and a negligent
third party operates as a bar to a later compensation claim against the employer. States which
have reached this result generally have statutes
requiring the injured employee to. elect between
receiving compensation or
against the third
In such
settlement with the third party would be m lieu
of the tort action, and a subsequent compensation claim would be barred because the claimant
had exercised his statutory option in favor of
proceeding against the third party. There may,
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however, be some doubt concerning this result
under statutes, such as Utah's, which permit
both compensation and a third-party suit. Since
an election of remedies is not required, it is arguable that it should make no difference whether
compensation is demanded prior to or subsequent
to an action against the third person. However,
this argument should be examined in light of the
fa.ct that part of (he reason for allowing thirdparty suits at all is to permit the employer or
the employer's insurance carrier to recoup what
has been paid for compensation by being subrogated to the employee's claim against the third
person. Since a release or settlement would discharge the third party's liability to the employee,
it wcmld effectively deprive the employer or
insurance carrier of his subrogation rights.
Therefore, to maintain a position consonant with
legislative intent and to protect the rights of
employers, a settlement between an employee
and a third person should preclude a subsequent
compensation claim aga,inst the emploY'er in

Utah."

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial
Commission erred in allowing the defendant, Dean L.
Barrett, to receive both 'Vorkmen's Compensation
benefits and the proceeds from his uninsured motorist
coverage. Further, it is submitted that the settlement
entered into between l\'Ir. Barrett and his liability car20

rier effectively negates the plaintiffs' right to subrogation and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not liable for additional \Vorkmen's Compensation benefits.
Respecfully submitted,
ROBERT D. :MOORE, of
RA\VLINGS, ROBERTS &
BLACK
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
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APPENDIX I
EXHIBIT A
STATE FA.R)l IXSCRANCE COl\IPANIES
Bloomington, Illinois
RELEASE AND TRCST
Policyholder-DEAN L. HARRETT
Claim N o.-44-221-330
Policy N o.-4059 7 57 44
Received of

STATE FARl\I MUTUAL
INSURANCE C 0 l\I PAN Y,
hereinafter called the Company, the sum of Six
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars and no/
100 ($6.250.00) in full settlement and final discharge
of all claims under the above numbered policy because
of bodily injuries known and unknown and which have
resulted or may in the future develop, sustained by
DEAN L. BARRE TT by reason of an accident or
occurrence arising out of the ownership or operation
of an uninsured automobile by ALBERT KINDRED
which occurred on or about the 10th day of November,
1966 at Tooele, Utah.
For the consideration aforesaid, and to the exent
of any payment made thereunder, the undersigned
agrees to hold in trust for the benefit of the Company
all rights of recovery which he shall have against any
person or organization legally liable for such bodily
injuries. and assigns to the Company the proceeds of
any settlement with or judgment against such persons
nr organization by specifically excepting any proceeds
recoverable under the workmens compensation statutes
of Ctah.
The Company is hereby authorized to take any
action which may be necessary either in law or in equity
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m the name of the undersigned against any such person
or organization, and the undersigned covenants and
agrees to cooperate fully with the Company in the presentation of such claims and to furnish all papers and
documents necessary in such proceedings and to attend
court and testify if the Company deems such to be
necessary.
The undersigned further warrants that he has
made no settlement with, given any release to or prosecuted any claim to judgment against any person or
organization legaUy liable for such bodily injuries,
and that no such settlement will be made, no such release
will be given and no such claim will be prosecuted to
judgment without the written consent of the Company.
IN WITNESS 'VHEREOF, I have hereunto
set my hand and seal this 22nd day of November, 1967.
Signed DEAN L. BARRETT
127 No. 8th E., Bountiful, Utah
Witness
Judy R. Summerhays
Notary & Witness
Sandy, Utah
This will certify that this document is a copy of the
original in Mr. Barrett's file.
Felix E. Jones
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